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Combat organizations are increasingly faced with the challenge to adapt to new and diverse
engagements.  The pace of change is being accelerated by advances in information technology.
This article offers perspectives from organization theory that can serve as design principles for
enabling combat organizations to adopt flexible structures to cope with changes in the external
environment.  The specific design principles articulated are technology-enabled virtual
organizations, organizational “semi-structures”, and anticipating the future by launching probes.
We discuss the implications of these principles for military organizations.
1. Introduction
Dramatic global events in the past decade have precipitated new ways of thinking about the basic
questions of how wars are fought, how forces are organized, and what are the objectives
underlying missions.  The focus of wars has shifted from a global bi-polar perspective to a
variety of regional and local conflicts.  Forces are increasingly organized with a view to creating
adaptable structures and joint force capabilities.  The objectives of engagements are becoming
diverse, e.g., peacekeeping or humanitarian missions in addition to traditional war fighting
missions.  The pace of change in all of these dimensions is being accelerated by rapid advances
in information technology.
Many of the innovations being explored in the structure of war fighting organizations are
contained within the concept of network-centric warfare.  Network-centric warfare envisages
building organizations that seek to accomplish their mission through flexibility in roles and
structures as well as autonomy of action.  Such organizations make extensive use of information
technology.  Generally speaking, they have two distinguishing characteristics: speed of command
and self-synchronization.  Speed of command, which depends on information superiority and
innovative command and control structures, seeks to achieve rapid massing of effects and ensure
rapid foreclosure of enemy courses of action.  It relies on the shock of closely coupled events for
added advantage.  Self-synchronization emphasizes non-hierarchical coordination for the dual
purposes of exploiting local information to reduce uncertainty and making efficient use of the
resources available.  Self-synchronization also allows for replanning to adapt to situation
changes as well as re-configuration of the command and control decision and execution
processes - all with minimum time to completion.  The concepts of speed of command and self-
synchronization are thought to be essential characteristics of the type of agile organizations
envisaged in Joint Vision 2010.
While the concept of network-centric warfare provides an overarchi g framework for organizing
the forces of the future, many of the core principles and concepts remain to be articulated and
refined.  In addition, there needs to be a sustained effort to create concrete guidelines that can
serve as design principles for organizing combat forces for mission planning and execution.  In
this research, we propose some first steps toward clarifying the conceptual underpinnings and
design principles underlying self-synchronizing organizations.  We seek to do this through an
explication of relevant research in organization theory as well as related work in complexity
theory.  Organization theory has examined self-designing organizations, e.g., those that are
capable of endogenous change on a continuing basis.  Related research in complexity theory has
discussed many of the principles of self-design under the umbrella of complex adaptive systems
and self-organizing criticality.  Our purpose is to weave the relevant strands in past research to
create a set of expectations for organizations performing combat missions.
2. Organization Theory
Two intertwined threads of research in organization theory are of specific significance in
discussing self-designing organizations (Borchert and Jones, 1999).  The first thread explores the
use of modified organizational forms, often enabled by information technology (Fu k and
DeSanctis, 1995).  The second thread examines the creation and survival of organizations that
are capable of rapid change and innovation (Br wn and Eisenhardt, 1997).  Together, these
threads constitute a perspective on the requirements for forming adaptive organizations critical to
the efficacy of network-centric warfare.
2.1 Technology-enabled organizational forms
In the corporate environment, the need for technology-enabled organizations has been
engendered by the increasingly global and competitive nature of contemporary business
environments, which require organizations to offer a greater variety of products as well as more
flexibility through customization.  The life cycles of individual products have become shorter,
thereby compressing the available window for recouping the expenses associated with product
development (Bettis and Hitt, 1995).  This has been accompanied by a progressive decrease in
the available time-to-market for the products (Brown and Eisenh r t, 1997).  These
developments have led organizations to seek new ways to reduce the cost and time required for
product development.  Companies have responded to the imperatives of current business
environments by using a variety of approaches such as concurrent design/engineering,
collaboration with other organizations for the design and/or manufacture of products, and the
partial outsourcing of product designs (D’Aveni, 1994; Fulk and DeSanctis, 1995; Hamel et al,
1989; Lele, 1992).  Typically, these approaches are being executed in the context of modified
organizational forms enabled by information technology, such as virtual organizations, strategic
alliances, partnerships and networked organizations (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Fulk and
DeSanctis, 1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993).
The concept of virtual organizations constitutes a particularly important innovation in this
regard. A virtual organization can be thought of as an ad hoc collection of individuals, brought
together for a specific purpose, e.g., the design of a product. These organizations are usually
cross-disciplinary in that the members come from different functions or specialties.  For
example, a product design team typically consists of representatives from research and
development, manufacturing and marketing (cf. Dou herty, 1992).  The membership of virtual
organization is often inter-institutional.  For example, multiple organizations sometimes pool
their expertise in product development (Cutkosky et al, 1996; Hardwick et al, 1996).  More
typically, representatives of suppliers and/or customers increasingly form an integral part of the
design teams of companies.  Finally, virtual organizations are transientin their existence
(Davidow and Malone, 1994).  That is, such teams are usually disbanded (or radically
restructured) after the assignment is completed (Grenier and Metes, 1995).  Virtual teams have
been used extensively in tasks as diverse as product design (Sweha, 1996), software development
(Dubinskas, 1993; Voegtli, 1996), management consulting (Dubinskas, 1993), and health care
(Pomerantz et al, 1995).
Virtual organizations share many of the properties of joint task forces designed for missions such
as humanitarian relief (wherein the core military units collaborate with local governmental units
and other institutional structures such as non-governmental organizations for a specific purpose),
coalition warfare and traditional combat missions.  For example, a joint task force is composed
of multiple components, each of which is cross-functional, being an aggregate of multiple
communities of practice.  Each community of practice is based on a specific knowledge domain.
Joint task forces are constituted for specific missions and similar to virtual organizations, re
disbanded after completion of the mission.
The use of virtual organizations offers several advantages (Mowshowitz, 1994).  The ability to
create temporary, dynamic project-oriented structures enables flexibility (cf. Nohria and Berkley,
1994).  Second, the composition of the teams can be tailored so as to provide an "optimal" mix of
skills for accomplishing a task (Grenier and Metes, 1995).  Third, because the teams do not have
to be co-located, they can include members who are also engaged in other tasks performed at
other locations.  Thus, virtual teams constitute a handy mechanism for bringing together
expertise that is otherwise dispersed across - or even located outside - an organization
(Dubinskas, 1993).  Fourth, because of their transient nature, virtual teams are less likely to be
burdened with the entrenched organizational routines and authority relationships that so often
inhibit performance in more permanent organizational structures (cf. Brown and Eisenhardt,
1997).  Finally, virtual teams offer a means to create organizational forms (such as task-specific
alliances with other organizations) that are difficult to accomplish in more conventional
situations (Fulk and DeSanctis, 1995).
However, virtual organizations also suffer from shortcomings, because the processes underlying
their collaborative activities are social as much as they are technical.  Such activities, e.g.,
articulation of doctrine and the commander’s intent, require shared understandings which emerge
from social interactions among individuals and groups.  The interactions are characterized by
extensive communications, both within the team as well as with individuals external to the
activity (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995).  The quality of the output therefore critically hinges on
the efficacy of the collaborative process.  This, in turn, depends on a team’s ability to create an
appropriate structure as well as adequate mechanisms for communication (Wholey et l, 1995).
The presence of a structure also helps an organization develop its own implicit culture and norms
(Carley, 1991), helps make sense of ambiguous situations (Weick, 1995), and provides a scaffold
to facilitate the learning and socialization of new members (cf. Lave and Wenger, 1991).
Now, consider a virtual organization such as a joint task force, which is comprised of multiple
entities brought together for a specific mission.  The ad hoc nature of the organization can imply
the lack of a well-established and time-tested structure for coordinating its functioning.  While
this may be ameliorated to an extent by the presence of a well-defined doctrine, the process of
melding the units may still be difficult because the key members may not be familiar with each
other.  In addition, the task at its initial stages can have a high degree of equivocality, at least in
how it is perceived across the different units in the organization.  Further, the cross-functional
and inter-institutional composition of the organization can create ambiguities in the status,
authority, and expertise of the members (Finholt et al, 1990).  All these difficulties may be
exacerbated by the geographical dispersion of the organization.  Thus, for a virtual organization
to function effectively, it would have to go through a period of time wherein these problems are
addressed and settled satisfactorily.  In essence, this constrains the range of tasks, missions and
time scales within which virtual organization can be deployed.  Thus, while virtual organizations
do offer much potential for solving a diverse set of problems, it needs to be noted that virtual is
not always virtuous (Chesborough and, 1995).
Organizations that innovate continuously
Research on organizations that innovate has traditionally followed the concept of punctuated
equilibrium, which perceives organizations as changing incrementally until a dramatic set of
events precipitates radical changes in their structure and processes.  In this view, organizations
are thought to function in a steady state of variations around an equilibrium; periodically, this
equilibrium is punctuated or disrupted, thereby causing tectonic shifts in the organization's
structure.  Thus, innovation is seen as dramatic and infrequent.
However, recent research has, pointed to a very different view of innovation in organizations.  In
this view, innovation in many organizations is not episodic in the sense of being shaped by
sharply defined perturbations.  Rather, the change occurs on a continuous basis, which over time
can dramatically alter the structure and profile of the organization.  These organization , often
referred to as of "high-velocity organizations" (Eise hardt, 1989; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997),
can be found in highly competitive industries, such as the computer industry.  These industries
are characterized by rapid product development, short product life-cycles and a continuously
changing competitive landscape.
In studying innovation in self-synchronizing combat organizations, the second view of
innovation strikes us as being particularly appropriate.  This is because the organizing structures
envisaged in network centric warfare share several features with high-velocity organizations.
For example, both types of organizations have to cope with harsh environments; which require
constant adaptability to ensure survival and success.  Thus, perspectives gleaned from
continuously innovating organizations can help shape our expectations and views of self-
synchronizing combat organizations.
Studies of continuously innovating organizations reveal two k y insights (Brown and Eisenhardt,
1997).  First, successful innovation on a continuous basis requires the presence of "semi-
structures".  Second, successful organizations anticipate the future by placing probes in the
environment.  We address each insight in turn.
Semi-structures
The term reflects a situation wherein an organization functions on the basis of a limited structure,
around which the managers are free to improvise.  The limited structure can consist of a set of
explicitly defined building blocks, e.g., well understood routines and procedures that remain
largely invariant, or clearly stated organizational priorities and managerial responsibilities.
These building blocks work as pivots around which the organization functions.  Managers are
free to improvise around these semi-structures, and often complement them with extensive
communication.  Semi-structures are similar to what Weick (1993) refers to as minimal
structures: a base-level structure that is essential for organizations to make sense of the
environment.
What are the boundary conditions for defining semi-structures?  In an abstract sense, a structure
should not be so rigid as to preclude innovation.  At the same time, the structure should be strong
enough to enable recovery from errors, and in general, prevent the organization from collapsing
from the consequences of the innovation.  At the rigid end of the spectrum, there are numerous
examples of how overly specified structures stifle innovation (an example from military domains
here?).  In contrast, the impact of inadequate structure is provided by Weick's (1993) description
of a team fighting forest fires.  The absence of even a minimal structure prevented the team from
formulating an adequate perception of the enormity of the fire, which resulted in several fatalities
among the firefighters.
A theoretical perspective for a better understanding of the stability of semi-structures is provided
by complex adaptive systems theory. The theory views organizations as systems with a large
number of independent but interacting actors (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997).  From the
perspective of this theory, organizations with self-design properties do reach steady states that
consist of multiple equilibria.  Instead, they keep changing continuously, in the process
remaining at the "edge of chaos".  However, because of their underlying structural properties,
these organizations seldom disintegrate.  The macro-structure (or semi-structure) of the
organization emerges from the collective interactions of the components of the complex system
(Kauffman, 1995; Waldrop, 1992).  Over a period of time, the decisions of individual
participants interact to reconfigure (or redesign) the organization's structure and processes in
order to adapt the organization to its environment (or adapt the environment to itself).  The semi-
structure, while stable, and hence resistant to the vagaries of the environment, does change over
time.  Complex adaptive systems theory discusses how changes in the organization follows a
power law – many small adaptations which do not change the semi-structure, and some large
changes that do affect the semi-structure.  Even the large changes are caused by what appear to
be relatively minor events (the tale of "for want of the nail, the horseshoe was lost, etc." is an
apocryphal way of expressing the magnitude of potential changes caused by small events.).  The
stability of the semi-structure (and therefore the viability of the organization) relies on its ability
to engage in self-organizing criticality (Bak, 1996), i.e., navigate the cusp that separates
adaptability from disaster.
The region of self-organizing criticality for an organization can be determined analytically,
primarily through the application of tools such as genetic algorithms.  However, as a practical
matter, defining the comfort zone for adequate structure is largely a question of experimentation,
wherein alternative structures are tested against a variety of scenarios to determine “families” of
semi-structures with stable properties.  It seems useful to consider war games and simulations
(backed eventually by Fleet Battle Experiments) as appropriate mechanisms for identifying the
region(s) of self-organizing criticality in combat organizations.
Probes into the Future
Much research on organizational competence stresses the need to form distinctive competences,
i.e., building from expertise developed in the past.  However, many continuously innovating
organizations also rely on the future to develop comp tences (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997).  The
preferred mechanism for accomplishing this is to develop a vision for the future.  The vision can
be formed in multiple versions.  The credibility of competing visions is established through
experimentation, typically by launching experimental products and gauging their performance.
This view of defining strategies (and consequently, missions) is much more experimental in
essence than traditional exercises, which rely on detailed definitions of strategies.  The
underlying rationale is that the future is difficult to anticipate.  As a result, neither rigid planning
for the future nor reacting to events is satisfactory.  Instead, the future c n be probed through a
variety of low-cost options, e.g., experimental products or strategic partnerships.
In one sense, Fleet Battle Experiments and related exercises are useful for these types of probes
into the future.  However, there is one important difference.  Whereas the probes instituted by
commercial organizations reveal “real” data, those instituted by combat organizations are
simulated, and as such, constituted best guesses about likelihood.  Thus it s even more important
for combat organizations to adopt mechanisms for change and adaptation.
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